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Abstract
In recent years, considerable effort has gone into understanding default reasoning. Most of
this effort concentrated on the question of entailment, i.e., what conclusions are warranted by a
knowledge-base of defaults. Surprisingly, few works formally examine the general role of defaults.
We argue that an examination of this role is necessary in order to understand defaults, and suggest
a concrete role for defaults: Defaults simplify our decision-making process, allowing us to make
fast, approximately optimal decisions by ignoring certain possible states. In order to formalize this
approach, we examine decision making in the framework of decision theory. We use probability and
utility to measure the impact of possible states on the decision-making process. More precisely, we
examine when a consequence relation, which is the set of default inferences made by an inference
system, can be compatible with such a decision-theoretic setup. We characterize general properties
that such consequence relations must satisfy and contrast them with previous analysis of default
consequence relations in the literature. In particular, we show that such consequence relations must
satisfy the properties of cumulative reasoning. Finally, we compare our approach with Poole’s
decision-theoretic defaults, and show how both can be combined to form an attractive framework
for reasoning about decisions.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We make numerous assumptions each day: the car will start, the road will not be blocked,
there will be heavy traffic at 5pm, etc. Many of these assumptions are defeasible; we
are willing to retract them given sufficient evidence. Humans naturally state defaults and
draw conclusions from default information. Hence, defaults seem to play an important
part in common-sense reasoning. To use such statements, however, we need a formal
understanding of what defaults represent and what conclusions they admit.
The problem of default entailment—roughly, what conclusions we should draw from
a knowledge-base of defaults—has attracted a great deal of attention. Many researchers
attempt to find “context-free” patterns of default reasoning (e.g., [13]). Such results are
certainly general in scope. We claim, however, that the utility of this approach is limited;
to gain a better understanding of defaults, we need to understand in what situations we
should be willing to state a default.
Our main thesis is that an investigation of defaults should elaborate their role in the
behavior of the reasoning agent. This role should allow us to examine when a default is
appropriate in terms of its implications on the agent’s overall performance. In this paper,
we suggest a particular role for defaults and show how this role allows us to provide a
semantics for defaults. Of course, we do not claim that this is the only role defaults can play.
Before we discuss the role of defaults, we need to clarify the starting point of this
discussion. The literature on default reasoning can be roughly divided into two lines
of investigation. The first line deals with the construction of default inference systems.
Such inference systems are initialized with some knowledge base of explicit default rules.
Given a set of ground facts (i.e., logical propositions) as input, such systems employ
some mechanism for inferring new conclusions (again, logical propositions) from the
input propositions and the available default knowledge base. The literature discusses
many different inference mechanisms that use different specifications of default rules and
different mechanisms for inferring conclusions [8,22,24,28].
The second line of research examines default inference systems as “black-boxes”. This
line of research studies default inference systems in terms of their input-output relation or,
more formally, the consequence relation which they define. That is, given some set of facts
φ as input, what consequences, ψ , will the system infer. This approach, which follows a
classical approach for defining logical inference [31], allows us to examine the question
of what properties a consequence relation (i.e., an inference system) should satisfy. Thus,
these works provide normative guidelines against which we can check any of the explicit
inference systems mentioned above. One of the earliest works to examine default inference
in such a manner is by Makinson [19,20]. Later works include [13,23]. Of course, the
division between the two lines of research is not sharp. There are several works that start
from properties of default consequence relations and use these to construct actual inference
mechanisms [11,15].
Our work focuses on consequence relations and their properties. We believe that in
many applications the end result of reasoning is a choice of action. Therefore, we ask
the following question: “Is there a decision-theoretic role for defaults that leads to a
consequence relation with desirable properties?” That is, can we reconcile the properties
of current default inference systems with decision theory? We believe that this is a crucial
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question to understand before one starts to devise an actual inference system for default
reasoning.
When adopting a decision-theoretic perspective, the quality of reasoning is judged by the
choice of actions it leads to. Ideally, an agent’s choice of action should be informed, taking
into account all possible contingencies. When we consider flying from London to Paris,
we should be aware of each alternative and various associated contingencies: if we choose
to fly, the French air-controllers may choose to strike, the plane may have mechanical
problems, or it could be hi-jacked; if we choose a ferry, the weather could be bad, we
could be delayed, we could be forced to land at a port other than the designated one, etc.
In practice, our choices are not optimal; there is too much uncertainty about the state of
the world and the effects of actions to allow for an examination of all possibilities. And
even if all this information were available, the computational effort and the time required
for deliberation would be too high.
We suggest that one role of defaults lies in simplifying our decision-making process by
stating assumptions that reduce the space of examined possibilities. More precisely, we
suggest that a default consequence relation φ → ψ is a license to ignore ¬ψ situations
when our knowledge amounts to φ. Hence, a default such as Winter →¬Strike provides
us with a license to ignore the possibility of an air-controllers strike during the winter.
In particular, when we consider flying to Paris during the winter, we need not take into
account the possibility of an air-controllers strike in our deliberations.
One particular suggestion that can be understood in this light is ε-semantics [23]. In
ε-semantics, we accept the consequence φ→ ψ if given the knowledge φ, the probability
of ¬ψ is very small. This small probability of the ¬φ states gives us a license to ignore
them. Although probability plays an important part in our decisions, we claim that we
should also examine the utility of our actions. For example, most people would have no
trouble accepting the default true→ Alive-Next-Year under this semantics, i.e. most people
believe it is highly unlikely that they will die next year. An agent making decisions based
on this default would practically ignore the possibility of death next year. If it is offered life
insurance, it would quickly decline it. Yet, in this context, the stakes are too high to ignore
this outcome, even though it is unlikely. We claim that contingencies should not be judged
based on their likelihood alone, but also based on their criticality. Thus, we suggest that the
license to ignore a set should be given based on its impact on our decision. To paraphrase
this view, we should accept Bird → Fly if assuming that the bird flies cannot get us into
too much trouble
To formalize our intuitions we examine decision-making in the framework of decision
theory [18]. Decision theory represents a decision problem using several components: a set
of possible states, a probability measure over these sets, and a utility function that assigns
to each action and state a numerical value. Classical decision theory then uses the expected
utility of an action as a measure of its “goodness”.
In order to define defaults we need to understand when can we “safely ignore” a set
of situations. When we ignore a set of situations consistent with our knowledge ϕ, our
expected utility calculations will only approximate the expected utility of actions given
ϕ. This approximation could lead to erroneous perception of the quality of actions, and
consequently, to bad decisions. We suggest that a set of states can be safely ignored if
a reasonably good action is chosen even when these states are ignored. Thus, we would
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consider a default consequence φ → ψ to be “safe” if the action we choose when we
consider only (φ ∧ψ)-states is a good approximation (in terms of expected utility) of the
action we would choose had we considered all φ-states. To implement this idea we propose
a measure on sets of states that captures their impact on the outcome of the decision-making
process. We accept the default φ→ ψ when the measure of φ ∧¬ψ is very small relative
to that of φ. We will show that the proposed measure satisfies our stated desideratum.
Our measure takes into account two factors: the probability of the set and the utilities
of actions on this set. If the probability of a set is small, then it seems that we can ignore
it. However, if the utilities of actions on this set are extreme, as in the insurance example
above, then we might not want to ignore it. On the other hand, if the utilities of all actions
on the set are very close, then all actions look similar on this set, so we should focus on the
differences among actions elsewhere.
This paper makes two contributions: Its first contribution is to advocate for a more
concrete approach to the study of defaults and default consequence relations in which a
specific role for defaults is required; with this role we have a better understanding of the
semantics, formal properties, and applications of defaults. The importance of having such
a role in mind cannot be overstated. Without it, a system designer lacks appropriate criteria
for answering three crucial questions:
(1) Which initial defaults should the system be equipped with;
(2) How will these defaults be used by the system, and
(3) Which defaults can the system deduce on its own based on its initial set of defaults.
The second contribution of this paper is a proposal for a concrete role for default
reasoning in the decision-making process and a study of suitable formal semantics that
fulfill this role. Thus, we can understand the implication of various properties of defaults in
a concrete setting: we can examine how such properties affect the agent’s decision-making
process. Moreover, our semantics grounds defaults in a well-established theory—decision
theory. Thus, we can use the tools provided by this theory when formalizing our intuitions
about decision making. It also provides common ground with other work that shares these
tools. In particular, we examine the relation between our defaults and statements such as
“if φ, than a is an optimal action” that have been studied by Poole [26]. We combine
the two types of statements in one framework, leading to a rich knowledge representation
language. Because Poole’s work shares the fundamental notions of decision theory, we can
integrate his approach into our framework in a semantically clean way. Finally, decision-
theoretic defaults supply us with a method for compiling decision-theoretic information
into a compact form. This compact form may allow for faster, albeit approximate, on-line
decision making.
We are certainly not the first to note the importance of utility considerations in default
reasoning. Similar intuitions were mentioned in many of the early works on default and
defeasible reasoning (e.g., [21]). In particular, several works examined the use of defaults in
guiding reasoning in terms of utility considerations (e.g., [14]). Indeed, decision-theoretic
foundations for defaults were advocated by Shoham [30] and Doyle [6]. Doyle provides a
formal analysis of “Pascal’s wager” and shows how an assumption can be justified in terms
of utility. Finally, Poole [26] examined a concrete notion of defaults that are grounded in
terms of decision theory. Unlike previous works (with the exception of [26], see Section 4)
we make decision theory the basis of a formal definition of defaults.
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic framework of
decision theory and relevant results in default reasoning. In Section 3, we formalize our
notion of defaults. We start with a simple definition and show that while it captures our
intuitions to some extent, it has some deficiencies. In particular, it fails to satisfy several
basic desired properties of default reasoning. We then develop a stronger notion of defaults
that does satisfy these desirable properties. In Section 4, we relate our suggestion to Poole’s
decision-theoretic defaults. We show that while these two notions are quite different, they
can be combined to create a framework for reasoning about decisions. We conclude with a
discussion in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Decision theory
We start by reviewing the basic setting of decision theory. (For more details, see [18].)
Decision theory deals with decisions in the face of uncertainty. A decision-theoretic context
is a tuple (S,O,A,Pr,U), where S is a set of possible states of the world before the
decision is made;O is a set of possible outcomes of actions, i.e., states of the world after the
decision is made and carried out;A is a set of possible actions, each one is a function from
S to O; Pr is a probability measure over S that captures (subjective) likelihood of each
state; and U is a utility function that maps outcomes in O to real numbers, that quantify
the desirability of outcomes. In the following discussion, we usually assume that S,O and
A are fixed, and do not mention them explicitly.
In a fixed decision-theoretic context the expected utility of an action a given evidence
E ⊆ S is defined as
EU(Pr,U)(a |E)=
∑
s∈E
Pr(s |E) ·U(a(s)),
where Pr(s | E) is the conditional probability of s given the evidence E. Note that,
semantically, the notion of evidence used in conditional probability is closely related to the
notion of only knowing studied in autoepistemic logic (e.g., [22]). In both cases, we restrict
our attention precisely to the set of states satisfying E. This interpretation of conditional
probability will impact our semantics for defaults.
Classical decision theory prescribes that given our assessment of a probability and utility
measures and given evidence E, we should choose an action that maximizes expected
utility, i.e., an action a such that
EU(Pr,U)(a |E)= max
a′∈A
EU(Pr,U)(a′ |E).
We denote by MEU(Pr,U)(E) the expected utility of the best action given E, i.e.,
MEU(Pr,U)(E)= max
a′∈A
EU(Pr,U)(a′ |E),
and by mEU(Pr,U)(E) the expected utility of the worst action, i.e.,
mEU(Pr,U)(E)= min
a′∈A
EU(Pr,U)(a′ |E).
(From here on we omit the subscript (Pr,U) whenever it is clear from the context.)
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We note that decision theory is only interested in the relative ordering of actions, given
E, i.e., the relations between EU(a | E) and EU(a′ | E). Since using a utility measure
U ′(·) = c1 · U(·) + c2, for c1 > 0 and c2, leads to the exact same conclusions, decision
theory treats U and U ′ as equivalent.
Decision theory usually does not deal explicitly with how we describe events or actions.
However, in our discussion of defaults we describe events using a logical language. We
assume that there is a language L that is closed under the usual propositional connectives
and a truth-assignment π that assigns to each state s ∈ S a subset of L. Intuitively, π(s) is
the set of sentences that are true at s. We require that the following conditions hold:
• φ ∈ π(s) if and only if ¬φ /∈ π(s).
• φ ∧ψ ∈ π(s) if and only if φ ∈ π(s) and ψ ∈ π(s).
From now on we will use Pr(φ) as an abbreviation of Pr({s | φ ∈ π(s)}).
2.2. Defaults consequence relations
The study of default statements, non-monotonic consequence relations, and conditionals
has a long tradition in artificial intelligence (see [7,9] for overviews). We denote by φ→ψ
the statement “Based on the facts φ, we conclude by default ψ”. 1 Note that such a
consequence rule does not summarize all the conclusions that we can make based on the
input φ. It just states that ψ is one of them.
A typical example is the following statements: Bird → Flies and Bird ∧ Penguin →
¬Flies. These two defaults state that when we know that we are dealing with a bird, we
assume by default that it flies. However if we learn that this bird is a penguin, then we
will revert our assumptions and assume that it does not fly. Default statements differ from
material implication in that they allow for exceptions. This is evident from the “all we
know” reading of defaults we use throughout this paper. If all I know about some object is
that is it a bird, I can jump to the conclusion that it flies. However, if I also know that it is
a penguin, I can no longer jump to this conclusion.
Defaults are intuitively appealing and seem to provide a natural language for specifying
common sense knowledge. Formal understanding of defaults turns out to be quite elusive;
there has been a great deal of discussion in the literature as to what the appropriate
semantics of defaults should be. While there is little consensus on the semantics of defaults,
there has been some consensus on reasonable “core” properties of defaults. This core was
suggested by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [13] and consists of the following properties:
REF. φ→ φ (Reflexivity).
LLE. If φ ≡ φ′, then from φ→ψ infer φ′ →ψ (Left Logical Equivalence).
RW. If ψ⇒ψ ′, then from φ→ψ infer φ→ ψ ′ (Right Weakening).
CUT. From φ→ ψ1 and φ ∧ψ1 → ψ2 infer φ→ ψ2.
1 This statement is a consequence relation and should be distinguished from a default rule that might be a part
of an agent’s knowledge base.
R.I. Brafman, N. Friedman / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 1–33 7
CM. From φ→ ψ1 and φ→ ψ2 infer φ ∧ψ1 →ψ2 (Cautious Monotonicity).
OR. From φ1 →ψ and φ2 → ψ infer φ1 ∨ φ2 → ψ .
REF states that φ is always a default conclusion of φ. LLE states that the syntactic
form of the antecedent is irrelevant: logically equivalent antecedents have the same
consequences. RW describes a similar property of the consequent: If ψ (logically) entails
ψ ′, then we can deduce φ → ψ ′ from φ → ψ . This allows us to combine default and
logical reasoning. CM and CUT state that if ψ1 is a default conclusion of φ, then ψ2 is a
default conclusion of φ if and only if it is a default conclusion of φ ∧ψ1: Discovering that
ψ1 holds (as would be expected, given the default) should not cause us to retract or add
other default conclusions. OR states that we are allowed to reason by cases: If the same
default conclusion follows from each of two antecedents, then it also follows from their
disjunction.
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor focus on consequence relations. A consequence relation
captures a particular way we make assumptions. Given a pair of formulas φ and ψ , this
relation determines whether we are willing to assume ψ given the knowledge φ. Formally,
they define a consequence relation Cn to be the set of defaults, such that φ → ψ ∈
Cn if ψ is among the consequences of φ. Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor characterize
cumulative reasoning by system C, composed of REF, LLE, RW, CM, and CUT, and
preferential reasoning by system P that contains system C and OR. A consequence relation
is cumulative (respectively preferential) if it satisfies system C (respectively system P),
i.e., the set of defaults is closed under applications of these rules. They suggest that
a “reasonable” consequence relation should be preferential. Furthermore they provide
representation theorems for cumulative and preferential consequence relations using order
relations over worlds. While we do not go into the motivation for these rules, they are
accepted as reasonable “core” properties that non-monotonic reasoning should satisfy.
2.3. ε-Semantics
Surprisingly, Pearl [23] (following Adams [1]) describes a probabilistic notion of
defaults, ε-semantics, that leads to preferential consequence relations. Intuitively, ε-
semantics accepts a default φ → ψ if Pr(¬ψ | φ) is very small. For example, we accept
the default bird → fly if the probability that a bird does not fly is very small. Formally,
to model “very small”, ε-semantics examines behavior in the limit, using sequences of
probability assignments rather than single probability assignments.
In order to define limiting behavior of a probability measure, [10] introduce the
following definition:
Definition 2.1. A parameterized probability distribution PPD is a family of probability
assignments, PP= {Prn | n > 0}. Given a PPD, PP, the induced consequence relation is
Cnε(PP)=
{
φ→ψ | lim
n→∞Prn (¬ψ | φ)= 0
}
. 2
2 To handle cases where Pr(φ)= 0, we define Pr(¬ψ | φ) to be 0 when Pr(φ)= 0.
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It can be shown that:
Lemma 2.2 [10]. Cn is a preferential consequence relation if and only if there is a PPD
PP such that Cn= Cnε(PP).
One problem with this semantics is that it requires a sequence of probability assign-
ments, rather than a single probability assignment. Neither the origin of this sequence nor
the meaning of the limit process are a priori clear. An alternative formulation, that of
Lehmann and Magidor [15], provides a possible answer. Rather than looking at sequences
of probability assignments, Lehmann and Magidor look at a single probability assignment,
albeit a non-standard one. That is, instead of using a standard probability measure over
the set of possible worlds, they use a function Pr that maps sets of possible worlds to a
non-standard extension of the interval [0,1]. Such extensions contain infinitesimals, i.e.,
elements that are smaller than all positive real numbers but still larger than 0. Lehmann
and Magidor propose the following condition for accepting a default:
α→ β iff Pr(¬β | α) is infinitesimal.
We shall write p ∼ 0 to denote the fact that p is an infinitesimal. It can be shown that
the consequence relation so defined is rational, i.e., it is a preferential consequence relation
satisfying the following property:
RM. From φ→ ψ1 and ¬(φ→¬ψ2) infer φ ∧ψ2 → ψ1.
Lehmann and Magidor’s formulation supports simple and elegant proofs of various
properties without requiring tedious ε/δ manipulations with limits. Hence, we will adopt
it. In fact, in a certain precise sense, the approach of Lehmann and Magidor and of
Goldszmidt, Morris, and Pearl are identical: One possible semantics for infinitesimals (and
indeed, an alternative approach to non-standard reals) is as representing sequences of real
numbers whose limits are 0. An infinitesimal can be defined as an equivalence class of
such sequences. Thus, assigning a non-standard value is equivalent to assigning a sequence
of real probabilities. The reason that in Lehmann and Magidor’s approach we obtain an
additional property is precisely because non-standard reals correspond to sequences of
standard reals whose limits exist. When Goldszmidt, Morris, and Pearl restrict themselves
to such sequences, they obtain RM as well.
The definition of infinitesimals as (converging) sequences of real numbers does not
resolve the basic question raised by the original ε-Semantics: how can we ground the
meaning of such sequences. There are two answers to this question. The first is pragmatic:
infinitesimals can be viewed as a mathematical abstraction of the notion of “very small”
numbers with nice properties. The second is more fundamental. In principle, one could
question the use of (standard) real numbers in probability theory to represent degrees of
belief. Indeed, people have raised this question, and one of the better answers was provided
by Savage [29] who showed that any decision maker that is willing to accept certain, quite
reasonable, restrictions on her preference over the outcomes of these decisions, can be
viewed as employing a real-valued function to represent her beliefs. Blum, Brandenburger,
and Dekel [3] show a set of choice axioms that weaken those of Savage [29]. Decision
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makers that accept their (weaker) restrictions on their preferences over the outcomes of
actions can be viewed as using a non-standard probability measures to represent their
beliefs. This result provides a normative justification for the use of non-standard probability
measures to represent states of information.
3. Decision-theoretic defaults
Our approach is based on the following idea: Given an appropriate measure of the
importance of a set of states in the decision-making process, we can ignore those states
of negligible importance. Thus, we will accept the default conclusion φ → ψ if the
“importance” of φ ∧ ¬ψ is very small in comparison to the importance of φ. In what
follows, we investigate two definitions that try to capture this idea. We will assume that
we are working in the context of pre-specified sets S,O,A as well as a non-standard
probability measure Pr over the set of possible worlds and a non-standard utility function
U on the set of outcomes. 3 Thus, we allow infinitesimal probability, utility, and expected
utilities. 4
3.1. Basic definition
A natural candidate for the “importance” of a set, is the maximal expected utility of
actions on this set. Suppose we know that we are in the set φ. Then we can express the
expected utility of an action a as the sum of the (un-normalized) expected utility of a on
the subset of φ satisfying ψ and on the subset of φ satisfying ¬ψ .
EU(a | φ)= Pr(ψ | φ) · EU(a | φ ∧ψ)+ Pr(¬ψ | φ) · EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ).
Thus, the contribution of the subset of φ satisfying ¬ψ to the expected utility of any action
given φ is bounded by Pr(¬ψ | φ) · MEU(φ ∧ ¬ψ). However, this upper bound may be
misleading. For example, the expected utility of all actions on φ ∧¬ψ might be the same
high value. Intuitively, in this case ¬ψ plays no role in determining what action is best on
φ, yet MEU(φ ∧¬ψ) is large.
Example 3.1. Consider a student faced with an AI exam. She can either study or not
study for the exam. She has very good background in mathematical logic, so if the exam
is devoted to logical formalisms, she will get a high grade whether or not she studies. Let
Exam denote the proposition “there is an AI exam tomorrow”. Let Logic-Only denote the
proposition “the exam is only about logical formalisms”, and suppose that the utility is
somehow related to the grade. In that case, if there is a reasonable chance that the exam
will be solely on logical formalisms, Pr(Logic-Only | Exam) ·MEU(Exam ∧ Logic-Only)
3 However, to simplify presentation, all our examples involve standard utility functions.
4 Our analysis can also be carried out, without a significant change in the spirit of the results, by examining
limit properties of sequences of standard (probability, utility) pairs. In fact, we used the sequence formulation in
the preliminary version of this paper. We use non-standard probabilities and utilities since they allow simpler and
more straightforward proofs.
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can be a significant number. That is, the subset of the set of states satisfying Exam which
satisfies Logic-Only can have a significant measure according to the above measure.
To be more concrete, let us suppose that the probability and utility functions are as
follows: Pr(Logic-Only | Exam)= 0.2, Pr(¬Logic-Only | Exam)= 0.8.
EU(· | Study) EU(· | Not-Study)
Exam∧ Logic-Only 100 90
Exam∧¬Logic-Only 90 50
In this case, we have Pr(Logic-Only | Exam) ·MEU(Exam∧ Logic-Only)= 20. Hence, it
seems that the weight of the set of states satisfying Logic-Only∧Exam is not insignificant
according to the above measure. However, notice that the contribution of this set to the
expected utility is almost independent of our choice of action: If the student does not study
we have Pr(Logic-Only | Exam) ·EU(Exam∧ Logic-Only | Not-Study)= 18, which differs
only slightly from the previous value (20).
Another problem with the above criterion is its sensitivity to positive linear trans-
formation of the utility function. Define a new utility function U ′ as follows: U ′(·) =
c1 · U(·)+ c2, where c1 > 0 and c2 are some arbitrary constants. It is well known that U
and U ′ express identical preferences. However, by appropriately choosing c1 and c2 the
value of Pr(Logic-Only | Exam) ·MEU(Exam∧ Logic-Only) using U ′ instead of U can be
increased or decreased arbitrarily.
We can overcome these problems by replacing MEU by the following “normalized”
measure:
G(A)=def MEU(A)−mEU(A)= max
a,a′∈A
(
EU(a |A)− EU(a′ |A)). (1)
We call G(A) the gain of A, since it measures how much can be gained if we choose a
good action instead of a bad one on A.
Example 3.2. Consider our lazy student again. The value G(Exam) would be calculated
as follows: The action Study yields the maximal expected utility on Exam, and the action
Not-Study yields the minimal expected utility on Exam:
MEU(Exam) = 0.2 · 100+ 0.8 · 90= 92,
mEU(Exam) = 0.2 · 90+ 0.8 · 50= 58.
Therefore,
G(Exam)= 92− 58= 34.
Whereas,
G(Logic-Only∧ Exam) = MEU(Logic-Only∧ Exam)−mEU(Logic-Only∧ Exam)
= 100− 90= 10.
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Hence, in this case, given that Logic-Only holds, our choice of action has little influence on
the utility of the outcome. Notice that this number does not take into account the relative
weight of the set of states in which Logic-Only holds, which would require multiplying it
by Pr(Logic-Only∧ Exam)= 0.2.
It is easy to check that Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·G(φ ∧ ¬ψ) bounds the potential loss incurred by
ignoring ¬ψ in the computation of expected utilities of actions:
∣∣EU(a | φ)− Pr(ψ | φ) · EU(a | φ ∧ψ)∣∣ Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·G(φ ∧¬ψ). (2)
However, we should remember that this error is relative to G(φ), since we cannot do worse
than mEU(φ) nor better than MEU(φ). This suggests that when we are willing to tolerate
a small error of size ε, we can ignore ¬ψ when we know φ if
Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·G(φ ∧¬ψ)
G(φ)
 ε.
In this case, we can safely ignore situations satisfying ¬ψ because Pr(ψ | φ) · EU(a |
φ∧ψ) is ε close to the actual expected utility on a when we know φ and we do not assume
ψ in addition. However, we usually do not want to fix an arbitrary ε. We overcome this
problem by resorting to the ideas of Lehmann and Magidor, replacing ε with an arbitrary
infinitesimal.
We define our first notion of defaults, which we will call “weak” for reasons that will
become apparent below.
Definition 3.3. A decision context D (weakly) satisfies the default φ → ψ , denoted
D |=w φ→ ψ , if either G(φ)= 0 or G(φ) > 0 and
Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·G(φ ∧¬ψ)
G(φ)
∼ 0. (3)
We define the consequence relation Cnw(D)= {φ→ ψ |D |=w φ→ψ}.
Definition 3.3 embodies the intuitions discussed above. As we saw in Eq. 2, the gain
of some subset multiplied by the subset’s conditional probability bounds the potential loss
incurred by ignoring that subset. If that loss is very small with respect to the potential gain
of the larger set, we can ignore the subset. Hence, our criterion for accepting a consequence
φ → ψ ensures that the quality of the system’s decisions is not reduced when such a
system interprets the default φ → ψ as a license to ignore states satisfying ¬ψ when
all it knows is that φ holds. This “all I know” reading is derived directly from the use
of probabilistic conditioning. Our computations are based on the value of expected utility
and probability given φ. The actual values of these probabilities can be quite sensitive to
additional information, as, in general, Pr(φ |ψ1) = Pr(φ |ψ1 ∧ψ2).
Note that, according to this definition, we ignore ¬ψ if the product of Pr(¬ψ | φ) and
the gain of φ ∧ ¬ψ is small. In line with our intuitions, this definition weighs both the
probability of the set and the utility of actions on states in the set. It is also easy to see
that this definition generalizes ε-semantics. If we choose utilities such that G(A)= c for
some constant c and for all non-empty sets A, then (3) becomes Pr(¬ψ | φ)∼ 0, which is
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equivalent to the definition of defaults in Lehmann and Magidor’s version of ε-semantics. 5
Thus, under certain choices of the utility function our definition becomes equivalent to ε-
semantics.
Proposition 3.4. Let S be a set of states. There is a set of actionsA, a set of outcomesO,
and a utility functionU , such that for each probability measure Pr, Cnε(Pr)= Cnw(Pr,U).
Proof. Let O = {0,1}, with U(x) = x for both 0 and 1. Let A contain two actions
a0(s)= 0 for all s ∈ S , and a1(s)= 1 for all states s ∈ S . It is easy to verify that G(A)= 1
for all non-empty sets A. It immediately follows that Cnε(Pr)= Cnw(Pr,U). ✷
Example 3.5. Returning to our confused student. We saw that G(Exam) = 34 and
G(Exam ∧ Logic-Only) = 10. We also have G(Exam ∧ ¬Logic-Only) = 90 − 50 = 40.
We can compute:
Pr(Exam∧ Logic-Only)G(Exam∧ Logic-Only)
G(Exam)
= 0.2 · 10
34
= 0.059,
Pr(Exam∧¬Logic-Only)G(Exam∧¬Logic-Only)
G(Exam)
= 0.8 · 40
34
= 0.941.
We can see that the states satisfying Logic-Only have little influence on the quality of our
decision. Had we chosen some arbitrary ε > 0.06 for our criterion, we could have accepted
the default Exam →¬Logic-Only. 6 Notice that the probability that Logic-Only holds is
0.2, which typically cannot be dismissed as insignificant.
Example 3.6. The student example illustrates a situation where a certain set can be
ignored despite the fact that its probability is significant. The insurance example provides
an example of the opposite case, where a set cannot be ignored despite the fact that its
probability is small. Suppose that Pr(Alive-Next-Year) = 0.9999 and that the utility of
taking life-insurance is −1000 if we remain alive and 1,000,000 if we die. The utility
of not taking life-insurance is 0 if we are alive and −1,000,000 if we die. We have
G(true)= (0.9999 ·0+0.00001 ·−1000000)−(0.9999 ·−1,000+0.00001 ·1,000,000)=
−10− (−999.9+ 10)= 999.9; G(Alive-Next-Year)= 1000; and G(¬Alive-Next-Year)=
2,000,000. Hence, despite the fact that dying is highly unlikely,
Pr(¬Alive-Next-Year) ·G(¬Alive-Next-Year)
G(true)
= 0.00001 · 2,000,000
999.9
= 0.2.
Hence, in this case, we should not accept the default true→ Alive-Next-Year.
5 In fact, it suffices to require that U is such that for all non-empty sets A, 0 < cG(A) d for some constants
c < d .
6 Of course, the value we obtained, 0.059, is not infinitesimally small. Hence, formally, we cannot accept this
default. However, infinitesimals are best viewed as a nice mathematical abstraction of the concept of a very small
number, and in our examples we shall not use infinitesimal often.
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Above we stated the desideratum that default conclusions should not affect the quality
of our decisions. Intuitively, an action is approximately optimal if its expected utility over
E is almost as good as MEU(E). Formally:
Definition 3.7. An action a is approximately optimal on a set E with respect to a decision
context D, if either G(E)= 0 or G(E) > 0 and
MEU(E)− EU(a |E)
G(E)
∼ 0. (4)
If G(E) = 0, we are faced with a trivial decision—our action has no affect on the
outcome, so any choice will do, and in particular, a. Otherwise, if
MEU(E)− EU(a |E)
G(E)
∼ 0,
the difference in utility between the best possible action and a is very small. Again, we
must normalize by G(E) to avoid being sensitive to positive linear transformations.
Definition 3.8. We say that a default φ→ ψ is approximation safe (with respect to D) if
every approximately optimal action on φ ∧ψ is also approximately optimal on φ.
Hence, if a default φ→ ψ is approximation safe, choosing a good action on φ∧ψ leads
to a good action on φ.
Theorem 3.9. If D |=w φ→ψ , then φ→ ψ is approximation safe with respect to D.
For this proof, we need a lemma.
Lemma 3.10. Let D be a decision-theoretic context. If D |=w φ→ ψ and G(φ) > 0 then
(a) G(φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ)/G(φ)∼ 1,
(b) G(φ ∧ψ)/G(φ) 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
We can now prove Theorem 3.9.
Proof. Suppose that D |=w φ→ ψ . If G(φ)= 0, then φ→ ψ is approximation safe.
Now assume that G(φ) > 0. Using Lemma 3.10(b) we get that G(φ ∧ψ) > 0.
From D |=w φ→ψ , we have
Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·G(φ ∧¬ψ)
G(φ)
∼ 0. (5)
Now suppose that a is approximately optimal on φ ∧ψ . Hence,
MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ)
G(φ ∧ψ) ∼ 0.
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Using Lemma 3.10(a), we get that
(MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ)) · Pr(ψ | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0. (6)
Since MEU(φ)MEU(φ ∧ψ)Pr(ψ | φ)+MEU(φ ∧¬ψ)Pr(¬ψ | φ), we have that
MEU(φ)− EU(a | φ)
G(φ)
 (MEU(φ ∧¬ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ)) · Pr(¬ψ | φ)
G(φ)
+ (MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ)) · Pr(ψ | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0+ 0= 0,
where the last step uses Eqs. (5) and (6) using the fact that MEU(φ ∧ ¬ψ) − EU(a |
φ ∧¬ψ)G(φ ∧¬ψ), and the fact that EU(a | φ) EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ)Pr(¬ψ | φ). Since
MEU(φ) EU(a | φ), we have that the left hand side is non-negative. Thus, we conclude
MEU(φ)− EU(a | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
This shows that φ→ψ is approximation safe. ✷
Let us pause to consider the developments so far. In order to facilitate quick and realistic
decision making by agents, we suggested a role for defaults as licenses to ignore states
in appropriate decision contexts. Next, we tried to come up with a formal criterion for
deciding whether or not a default conclusion should be admitted by the system, and one
such criterion was suggested in Definition 3.3. We showed that the quality of decisions
made by agents that use defaults satisfying this criterion remains near optimal. Now,
we wish to examine the logical properties satisfied by the class of defaults induced by
Definition 3.3. The motivation for studying these properties is twofold: First, we wish to
have a better grasp of this class of defaults. Second, we would like to know which inference
rules could be used by an inference system that performs default inference according to this
decision-theoretic interpretation.
As we saw, Definition 3.3 satisfies our stated criteria of approximation. However, the
induced consequence relations, in general, are not cumulative. In particular, RW does not
hold.
Example 3.11. Consider the following example, where we have two propositions p and
q , and four equi-probable states. Utilities of two actions a1 and a2 are defined according
to this table:
p ∧ q p ∧¬q ¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q
a1 10 0 5 5
a2 0 10 10 10
It is easy to check that true→¬p is satisfied according to Definition 3.3, simply because
G(p)= 0. However, true→ (¬p ∨¬q) is not satisfied since G(p ∧ q)= 10.
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RW is violated because the gain of a set might be small, while the gain of (some of)
its subsets might be very high. This phenomenon occurs because of “canceling out”, i.e.,
actions that are good on one subset are bad on another, and vice versa. In our example,
a1 and a2 “cancel out” on p. When we examine the whole set, this phenomenon is
undetectable, since we only examine the expected utilities of actions. It is easy to construct
similar counterexamples to CUT, CM and OR.
This example shows a basic property of defaults that does not hold in our case:
• From φ→ false infer φ ∧ψ→ false.
In Lehmann and Magidor’s semantics, φ → false holds only when Pr(φ) = 0. It
immediately follows that Pr(φ∧ψ)= 0, and thus φ∧ψ→ false. 7 As the example shows,
in our semantics it is possible that G(p)= 0 and at the same time that G(p∧q) > 0. Since
G(p) = 0, our choice of actions will not change the utility, and thus we can safely make
any assumption, including the inconsistent one. Thus p→ false. On the other hand, since
G(p ∧ q) > 0, we stand to lose utility by making the inconsistent assumption, and indeed
p ∧ q→ false does not hold.
As we can see, Definition 3.3 is quite weak, and we will soon attempt to strengthen it.
However, before we discuss how to deal with this issue, we examine what properties are
satisfied by this definition. We define the following weak variant of RW:
RWw . If ψ1 ⇒ψ2, then from φ→ψ1 and φ→ (ψ2 ⇒ψ1) infer φ→ ψ2.
To understand the nature of this rule, we need to examine properties of G. As we noted
above, if B ⊂ A, then G(A) does not necessarily provide an upper bound on G(B). This
is an artifact of “canceling out”, i.e., a big difference in the expected utility of actions on
B is canceled out by their expected utility on A \B . But this implies that if G(B) is much
bigger than G(A), then G(A \ B) must also be big. In fact, we can show that if G(A) is
infinitesimally small, then G(B) · Pr(B | A) and G(A \ B) · Pr(A \ B | A) must be of the
same magnitude. Formally, we can upper bound and lower bound G:
Lemma 3.12.
(a) G(A)G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)−G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A).
(b) G(A)G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)+G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A).
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
Using this insight we can understand RWw : The default φ → ψ1 implies that G(φ ∧
¬ψ1) is small (with respect to G(φ)). The formulae φ∧¬ψ1∧¬ψ2 and φ∧¬ψ1∧ψ2 form
a disjoint partition of φ ∧¬ψ1; if one of them is small, then the other is also. In addition,
φ→ (ψ2 ⇒ψ1) implies that G(φ∧¬ψ1 ∧ψ2) is small, hence G(φ ∧¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2) is also
small. But, this is exactly the desired conclusion.
Similar reasoning leads to the following weak versions of CUT and CM:
CUTw . From φ→ ψ1, φ→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2) and (φ ∧ψ1)→ ψ2, infer φ→ ψ2.
7 Similar situations occur in Pearl’s ε-semantics. In that case, φ→ false holds only when Prn(φ) = 0 from
some point onward in the PPD. Again it follows that Prn(φ ∧ψ)= 0 and thus φ ∧ψ → false.
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CMw . From φ→ ψ1, φ→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2), φ→ ψ2, and φ → false, infer (φ ∧ψ1)→ψ2.
Let system Cw be the system containing REF, LLE, RWw , CUTw and CMw . We can
then show:
Theorem 3.13. If D is a decision context, then Cnw(D) satisfies system Cw .
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
It is unclear to us at this stage whether system Cw is complete, or whether there are other
rules that hold for this definition. Notice that from CUTw and RW we can derive CUT, and
from CMw and RW we can derive CM for premises φ such that φ → false. Thus, the main
difference between system Cw and system C is the weaker version of right weakening.
3.2. Strong definition
The results presented so far show that the most natural definition of defaults that satisfies
our decision-theoretic desiderata (i.e., being approximation safe) has weak properties. We
consider the failure to satisfy properties of cumulative reasoning to be a serious one. Three
properties of cumulative reasoning are especially important. The first is the AND property:
AND. From φ→ψ1 and φ→ψ2 infer φ→ψ1 ∧ψ2.
This property is derived from system C (see [13]) and deals with modularity of
assumptions. It states that if we can safely assume ψ1 and also safely assume ψ2, then we
should be able to assume both. This property, however, is not guaranteed by Definition 3.3.
The second property of cumulative reasoning that our definition does not satisfy is CM.
It states that if we happen to learn that some of our assumptions are true, we do not retract
our previous assumptions. Suppose, for example, that I assume by default that my car will
start, and that it is a sunny day. If, I then learn that the day is sunny, it seems intuitive
that I should not need to retract my conclusions about the car. Again, this property is not
guaranteed by Definition 3.3.
Finally, a third property that is not satisfied by the current definition is RW, and this
fact has some unfortunate implications as well. Ideally, we would like a system to have an
anytime property. That is, if the system is given more time, it should be able to improve
its decision. When RW is not satisfied, we could be faced with the opposite, unfortunate
behavior, where additional deliberations lead to a worse conclusion. For example, suppose
that we accept the default φ → ψ . Our semantics guarantees that an agent making a
decision when all it knows is φ can restrict its attention to the consequences of actions on
states satisfying φ∧ψ . However, suppose that this agent has more time for deliberation and
it starts examining the effect of its actions in the states satisfying φ ∧¬ψ , the states that it
was allowed to ignore. After it has examined some of these states, say those satisfying χ , it
is interrupted, and it must perform the chosen action. Hence, in effect, the agent is basing its
decision on the effect of actions on the set (φ∧(ψ ∨(¬ψ∧χ))). Unfortunately, this choice
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of action could be sub-optimal because φ → ψ does not entail φ → (ψ ∨ (¬ψ ∧ χ)),
although the latter default follows from the former when the system satisfies RW.
In general, we believe that properties of cumulative reasoning are indeed basic properties
of any notion of defaults; if we do not satisfy cumulative reasoning, we must reexamine
our assumptions whenever we have additional information, even if this information is
consistent with our previous default conclusions. Such behavior seems undesirable. Thus,
we would like to add the additional desideratum that accepted defaults are cumulative. This
leads us to ask: is there a natural definition of decision-theoretic defaults that satisfies both
desiderata?
Our definition of defaults is “almost” cumulative, except that it does not satisfy RW. The
problem was that our measure of the importance of a set of states was not monotonic—one
would expect that a set A would be more important than each of its subsets. Yet, even if
G(A) is small, it is quite possible that G(B), for some subset B of A, will be very large.
In fact, even if we multiply G(B) by the its relative weight in A, i.e., by Pr(B |A), we can
still have G(B) · Pr(B | A) >G(A). In other words, the measure G(A) is not informative
about the behavior of actions on subsets of A. To overcome this problem we introduce a
more cautious measure of sets. In some sense, we force G into a monotonic measure ∆:
∆(A)=def max
B⊆APr(B |A) ·G(B) (7)
for non-empty A, and define ∆(∅)= 0.
Example 3.14. We consider Example 3.11 again. Recall that the probability of all four
states is 0.25 and the utilities are as follows:
p ∧ q p ∧¬q ¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q
a1 10 0 5 5
a2 0 10 10 10
We have the following values for G:
p ∧ q p ∧¬q ¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q p ¬p q ¬q true
G 10 10 5 5 0 5 2.5 7.5 2.5
We can see that G is not monotonic, e.g., G(p∧q)= 10>G(p)= 0, and G(¬q)= 7.5 >
G(true)= 2.5. Even if we multiply the G values by the probability of the sets, this property
still holds: e.g.,
G(p ∧ q) · Pr(p ∧ q)= 2.5>G(p)Pr(p)= 0
and
G(¬q)Pr(¬q)= 3.375>G(true)Pr(true)= 2.5.
The ∆ values of these sets are as follows:
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p ∧ q p ∧¬q ¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q p ¬p q ¬q true
∆ 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 7.5 3.375
The values for the larger sets were obtained as follows:
∆(p)=max{10 · 0.5,10 · 0.5,0} = 5,
∆(¬p)=max{5 · 0.5,5 · 0.5,5} = 5,
∆(q)=max{10 · 0.5,5 · 0.5,2.5} = 5,
∆(¬q)=max{10 · 0.5,5 · 0.5,7.5} = 7.5,
and finally
∆(true)
=max{10 · 0.25,10 · 0.25,5 · 0.5,5 · 0.5,0 · 0.5,5 · 0.5,2.5 · 0.5,7.5 · 0.5,2.5}
= 3.375.
Finally, the ∆(·) · Pr(·) values of these sets are:
p ∧ q p ∧¬q ¬p ∧ q ¬p ∧¬q p ¬p q ¬q true
∆(·) · Pr(·) 2.5 2.5 1.25 1.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.375 3.375
As can be seen, these values are monotonic.
It is easy to check that if B ⊆ A, then Pr(B|A) · ∆(B)  ∆(A). Thus, ∆(A) is more
informative about the behavior of subsets of A than G(A). In particular, if
Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·∆(¬ψ ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0,
then we can conclude that
Pr(¬ψ ′ | φ) ·G(¬ψ ′ ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0
for all ψ ′ such that ψ ⇒ ψ ′. This suggests that the following definition satisfies our
desiderata.
Definition 3.15. A decision context D (strongly) satisfies the default φ → ψ , denoted
D |=s φ→ ψ , if G(φ)= 0 or if
Pr(¬ψ | φ) ·∆(¬ψ ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0. (8)
The intuition behind this stronger definition is identical to the weaker definition:
Definition 3.3. Again, assuming one accepts the role for defaults advocated in this paper,
the criterion provided in Definition 3.15 can be used to determine whether or not to accept
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the default φ→ψ into one’s database. This condition stipulates that the relative influence
of the set of states satisfying ¬ψ ∧ φ and all its subsets with respect to the quality of
decisions when all we know is φ is insignificant.
We define the (strong) consequence relation of D as
Cns(D)=def {φ→ ψ |D |=s φ→ψ}.
It is easy to verify that this definition of defaults is indeed more restrictive than
Definition 3.3.
Proposition 3.16. Let D be a decision context. If D |=s φ→ψ , then D |=w φ→ψ .
Proof. Immediate from the definition, since ∆(φ ∧¬ψ)G(φ ∧¬ψ). ✷
An immediate corollary is that if φ → ψ is strongly satisfied by D then it is
approximation safe with respect to D. Hence, the new criterion meets our central
desideratum: by assuming that ψ holds when all we know is φ and our database contains
the default φ→ ψ , we will not alter (at least not noticeably) the quality of our decisions.
Moreover, we can show that this notion of defaults satisfies cumulative reasoning, except
for a slightly revised version of CM, which we denote by CM′.
CM′. From φ→ψ1, φ→ ψ2, and φ → false, infer φ ∧ψ1 →ψ2.
We use system C′ to denote this revised version of system C.
Theorem 3.17. If D is a decision context, then Cns(D) satisfies system C′.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
This result shows that Definition 3.15 satisfies our desiderata using a natural decision-
theoretic construction. In particular, system C′ satisfies the AND rule.
Proposition 3.18. AND is valid in system C′.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
3.3. The OR rule
The last section showed how to obtain cumulative reasoning in our framework.
Recall that preferential reasoning is defined to be cumulative reasoning combined with
the OR rule. Most accepted semantics of defaults, in particular, preferential structures
and ε-semantics, lead to preferential consequence relations. Is OR satisfied in the two
approaches we described? As the following example shows, this is not necessarily the
case.
Example 3.19. Consider the following scenario. An agent is contemplating two possible
investments. He can either buy the stocks of company A, an oil producer, or those of
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company B, a plastic manufacturer. The success of either investment is greatly dependent
on changes in the price of oil. If oil prices rise, company A’s profits will increase. However,
since plastic is an oil by-product, the cost of raw material for company B will rise, and
its profits will decline. On the other hand, if oil prices decline, company A’s profits will
decline, and company B’s profits will increase. This situation is complicated by news of
a technological break-through in oil refinement. This technology is expected to decrease
the cost of oil refinement, reducing the costs for both companies. But it will have a more
dramatic effect on company B by improving the quality of its raw material. However, this
technology is still in early stages of development, and is not likely to have any effect on
the market in the next few years.
These considerations are captured by the following (parameterized) decision-theoretic
setting, where T stands for technological break-through, O+ stands a rise in oil prices, O−
stands for a fall in oil prices, and ε is an arbitrary infinitesimal.
O+ ∧¬T O+ ∧ T O− ∧ T O− ∧¬T
Pr 1/2− ε ε ε 1/2− ε
A 1 6 4 −1
B −1 9 11 1
Suppose the agent knows that oil prices will rise. Then, he can ignore the possible
emergence of new technologies. To see this, notice that G(O+) = 2 + ε, and that
G(O+ ∧ T) = 3ε, so that we would accept O+ → ¬T . Similar considerations show that
if the agent knows that oil prices will fall, he can also ignore the new technology, i.e.,
O− →¬T . What happens when the agent does not know whether oil price will rise or fall?
In that case, he cannot ignore the possibility of new technology. Without knowledge about
the direction of oil prices, investing in A or in B is more or less the same, except when the
new technology arrives. In that situation the plastic industry is clearly a better choice. This
type of consideration, which is secondary when the agent has more knowledge, becomes a
major consideration in the decision without that knowledge. Technically, we have that
G(O+ ∨O−)=G(T)= 10ε,
thus we cannot accept the default O+ ∨O− →¬T . And if the agent accepts this default,
he is likely to make the wrong choice, i.e., buy into the oil company.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that OR is not satisfied in our system. The essence of
OR is reasoning by cases: If when φ1 holds we can assume ψ , and when φ2 holds we
can assume ψ , then we should also assume ψ when we know that one of these cases is
true. However, as noticed by a number of researchers, (e.g., [13,17,25]) this rule might
be inappropriate when we read the antecedent of the default as “I only know φ”. This is
precisely the reading warranted by our semantics, Indeed, “I only know φ” is not equivalent
to “I only know φ ∧ ψ” or “I only know φ ∧ ¬ψ”. Hence, under our reading of defaults,
OR is not a natural property.
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4. Poole’s decision-theoretic defaults
Poole [26] introduces a semantics for defaults that is also based on decision theory. His
motivation is similar to our own, yet his proposal is very different. We now briefly review
his semantics. A default in Poole’s system has the form φ❀ a, and reads “Given evidence
φ, do action a”. This default caches information about the best action to perform when we
get evidence φ. Such a default is accepted in a decision-theoretic context (Pr,U) if action
a maximizes the expected utility over φ, that is
EU(a | φ)=MEU(φ). (9)
Poole argues that this definition naturally captures many real-life defaults. He gives
examples of default statements that conclude what action to perform, such as “if you
are in Vancouver in November, carry an umbrella”. He shows that his semantics satisfies
several desirable criteria, such as non-monotonicity, specificity, and ignoring irrelevant
information.
Poole would ultimately want his semantics to capture regular defaults, such as “birds
typically fly”. However, these defaults have formulas as their conclusions, not actions.
Poole attempts to overcome this problem using the following idea: With each proposition
p, he associates three actions: pt , pf , pu. These actions stand for: assume that p is
true, assume that p is false, and do not make assumptions on p, respectively. Poole then
represents defaults such as “birds typically fly” as Bird❀ Flyt . He shows that under certain
(rather strong) assumptions on the utility of these actions, he can give accepting conditions
for defaults in terms of Pr and U . Poole’s solution forces us to examine utilities of actions
of a specific form—making assumptions. It seems to us that unless we have a good model
of how making assumptions affects the choice of “real” actions (i.e., actions in the world),
it is quite difficult to assess their utility. Moreover, it is unclear whether such a model will
satisfy the requirements of Poole’s analysis. Our approach to defaults circumvents these
problems by examining the utility of the actual actions available to us when we face the
decision. In any particular context we face a choice between several concrete decisions.
The context describes the possible outcomes these decisions can lead to and their resulting
utilities.
In spite of this criticism, we believe that defaults of the form φ ❀ a are useful, and
suggest that Poole’s defaults can be combined with our notion of defaults. This leads to a
system where we can state defaults about actions to perform, as well as assumptions that
can be made. We now outline the synthesis of Poole’s defaults and our system into a joint
framework.
Recall that Poole’s original semantics for φ❀ a is that EU(a | φ)=MEU(φ). We want
to provide a similar definition in terms of decision contexts. Instead of stating that a is the
best action, given φ, we state that a is a safe approximation. Formally:
Definition 4.1. A decision context D satisfies φ❀ a if either G(φ)= 0 or
MEU(φ)− EU(a | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
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This definition is very much in the spirit of Poole’s original one, and we can show that the
same properties are satisfied. Moreover, there are interesting interactions between Poole’s
defaults and ours.
Theorem 4.2. The following rules of inference are valid for → and❀:
(1) If φ ≡ φ′, then from φ❀ a infer φ′❀ a.
(2) From φ⇒ψ and φ❀ a infer φ ∧ψ❀ a.
(3) From φ ∧ψ❀ a and φ ∧¬ψ❀ a infer φ❀ a.
(4) From φ→ ψ and φ ∧ψ❀ a infer φ❀ a.
(5) From φ→ false infer φ❀ a.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
Item (3) in this theorem shows that our definition of Poole’s default satisfies the sure
thing principle [29]: if a is a good action when I know φ ∧ ψ , and a good action when I
know φ ∧¬ψ , then it is a good action when I just know φ. Moreover, the fourth and fifth
properties show the direct relation between our defaults and approximately good actions:
if φ→ψ , then a good action when I know φ is also good when I know φ ∧ψ . We believe
that the combination of both types of default is useful.
5. Discussion
Our starting point was the thesis that knowledge representation and reasoning method-
ologies are better understood once they are grounded. By grounding default conclusions in
decision theory, and consequently in the agent’s choice of action, we have been able to de-
termine desiderata that default making system should satisfy. Consequently, we now have
a better understanding of what default conclusions an agent should make. These depend on
the specific context of the agent: its beliefs (i.e., probability) its goals (i.e., utility), and the
actions available to it.
By grounding default inference in a decision-theoretic context, we have also been
able to relate defaults to other forms of knowledge, namely, Poole’s default actions. We
believe that knowledge is not, in general, homogeneous. It is composed of various types of
statements, and clearly there are interactions between these statements. Grounding these
different types of statements in a common basis allows us to understand these interactions.
In our case, the interactions between Poole’s defaults and ours described in Theorem 4.2
are not arbitrary; they are a consequence of the semantics of both defaults in terms of
decision-theoretic contexts.
We have not attempted to provide a directly applicable framework, although our
semantics could be interpreted as providing an off-line mechanism for compiling defaults.
Nevertheless, there is a fundamental lesson here for system designers. If one constructs a
knowledge-based system that must act in some environment, and if this knowledge-based
system incorporates some type of default assertions, one should carefully note how they
interact with that system’s decision-making process. A likely scenario is that the system
maintains some information about the current state of the world and acts based on this
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information. The inference mechanism used to update the state of the world is likely to
employ various defeasible assumptions—it is unlikely that any practical application can
function without making such assumptions. Indeed, in the past few years we have seen a
number of attempts to use a formal, logic-based methods to control actual systems (e.g.,
the line of work on cognitive robotics [4,16]). Some of these systems, e.g., the logic-based
subsumption architecture of [2], actually employ defaults, and their deployment in actual
environments requires careful attention to this issue.
Under this scenario, our work supplies two important insights: First, a system designer
should carefully consider the type of default assertions she introduces in her database.
These default assertions interact with the decision procedure used, and should be viewed
in this context—when using non-monotonic logic (rather then probability theory) there is
no clean border between what’s true and what’s desirable, and these components cannot
be designed independently. As we saw, the typical intuitions as to which default assertions
should be incorporated into the system can be misleading. Typically, one accepts the default
φ → ψ when ψ is highly likely given that we know φ. As we showed, such defaults
could lead to undesirable behavior, and it is this eventual behaviour that should be kept in
mind when accepting defaults. Second, as we still wish to reduce the need of the designer
to explicitly specify all default assertions, we would like to know how a system could
infer new default assertions from existing default assertions. By formalizing the above
intuitions we were able to provide partial answers to this question. In particular, as we saw,
cumulative reasoning makes sense, but the OR rule is problematic.
Both ε-semantics and our decision-theoretic semantics are defined using non-standard
probability measures, or alternatively, using sequences of probability measures. These
structures, which may not appear intuitive at first sight, can be understood in two ways.
First and foremost, the results of [3] give us license to use this type of representation to
describe an agent’s choice behavior if we accept their postulates, postulates strictly weaker
than Savage’s. However, another view of non-standard numbers is as a mathematical
idealization. This idealization allows us to talk about very small quantities or very big
quantities, and in particular, the quotient ε, without committing to a particular value. This
point highlights an important problem in non-monotonic reasoning as well as probabilistic
reasoning: what is an acceptable notion of approximation? It is clear that setting a fixed
threshold value is a crude way of defining approximation. Similarly, the use of limits is
also quite crude.
Of course, in real applications, we can often set a threshold value, below which things are
considered small enough to be ignored. Once we fix this threshold we accept a default when
the expression in (3) (or (8)) is smaller than this threshold. This definition approximates
the notions we examined here, but it does not satisfy the inference rules we describe.
However, we can reason using these inference rules and accept the possibility that we
will get conclusions that might violate the fixed error margin. This provides a way of
getting “fast and dirty” conclusions. Such an approach has been applied in the in ε-
semantics literature, and work such as [5] indicates that such approximations might be
quite useful. A possible avenue of future research is to use this method in knowledge-
compilation of decision-theoretic information [12]. Roughly speaking, in this method, off-
line computation will generate a set of defaults using some parameter ε. These defaults
(and their logical consequences) will be used at run-time to ignore various possibilities,
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hence reducing the amount of time spent in evaluating possible actions. As with any type
of information, there is a tradeoff between the quality of the inference made (decision in
this case) and the time spent on making this inference. Decision-theoretic defaults can
be viewed as summarizing the information encoded in the underlying decision-theoretic
context and may allow for faster on-line computations.
Our analysis is based on static or “one-shot” decision theory. Recently, there has been
much work on decision making in dynamic environments (e.g., Markov Decision Processes
[27]). The notion of expected utility in these models is somewhat more complicated.
However, similar considerations about probability and utility apply when one attempts to
ignore various possible states, i.e., we would like to ignore a state if it has little impact on
the quality of action we later choose. It would be an interesting challenge to define notions
similar to default assumptions in the framework of Markov Decision Processes and to use
these results to provide fast and approximately optimal planning in this setting.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 3.12.
(a) G(A)G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)−G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A).
(b) G(A)G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)+G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A).
Proof. By the definition of expected utility, we can write
EU(a |A)= EU(a |A∩B)Pr(B |A)+ EU(a |A∩B)Pr(B |A).
Subtracting this equation for two actions a and a′ we get
[
EU(a |A)− EU(a′ |A)] = [EU(a |A∩B)− EU(a′ |A∩B)]Pr(B |A)
+ [EU(a |A∩B)− EU(a′ | A∩B)]Pr(B |A). (10)
We get part (a), by choosing a and a′ so that G(A ∩ B) = EU(a | A ∩ B) − EU(a′ |
A∩B).
G(A) 
[
EU(a |A)− EU(a′ |A)]
= G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)− [EU(a′ |A∩B)− EU(a |A∩B)]Pr(B |A)
 G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)−G(A∩B) · Pr(B | A).
Choosing a and a′ so that G(A)= EU(a |A)− EU(a′ |A), we get
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G(A) = [EU(a |A∩B)− EU(a′ |A∩B)]Pr(B |A)
+ [EU(a |A∩B)− EU(a′ |A∩B)]Pr(B |A)
 G(A∩B) · Pr(B |A)+G(A∩B) · Pr(B | A). ✷
Lemma 3.13. Let D be a decision-theoretic context. If D |=w φ→ ψ and G(φ) > 0 then
(a) G(φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ)/G(φ)∼ 1;
(b) G(φ ∧ψ)/G(φ) 0.
Proof. Assume that D |=w φ→ψ and G(φ) > 0.
By Lemma 3.12(a), we have that
G(φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ)G(φ)+G(φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ).
Dividing both sides by G(φ), we get
G(φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ)
G(φ)
 1+ G(φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ)
G(φ)
.
Similarly, from Lemma 3.12(b), we get
G(φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ)
G(φ)
 1− G(φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ)
G(φ)
.
Now, since D |=w φ→ ψ , we have that
G(φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Thus, we conclude
G(φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 1.
From part (a) it follows immediately that G(φ ∧ ψ) > 0, and by dividing part (a) by
Pr(ψ | φ) we get part (b) of the lemma. In particular, if Pr(ψ | φ) 0 then the quotient is
bounded and otherwise it is infinite. ✷
Theorem 3.14. If D is a decision context, then Cnw(D) satisfies system Cw .
Proof.
REF. By definition, Pr(¬φ | φ)= 0, we get that
G(φ ∧¬φ)Pr(¬φ | φ)
G(φ)
= 0.
LLE. By definition, if φ ≡ φ′, then G(φ) = G(φ′), G(φ ∧ ¬ψ) = G(φ′ ∧ ¬ψ), and
Pr(¬ψ ∧ φ)= Pr(¬ψ ∧ φ′). Thus, if D |=w φ→ ψ , then D |=w φ′ →ψ .
RWw . Assume that ψ1 ⇒ψ2, D |=w φ→ψ1 and D |=w φ→ (ψ2 ⇒ψ1).
If G(φ)= 0, then D |=w φ→ψ2. Now, assume that G(φ) > 0.
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Since D |=w φ→ ψ1, we have that
G(φ ∧¬ψ1)Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Since D |=w φ→ (ψ2 ⇒ψ1), we have that
G(φ ∧¬ψ1 ∧ψ2)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Using Lemma 3.12(a), we have that
G(φ ∧¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2)Pr(¬ψ2 | ¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ ∧¬ψ1)+G(φ ∧¬ψ1 ∧ψ2)Pr(ψ2 | ¬ψ1 ∧ φ).
Multiplying both sides by Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)/G(φ) 8 we get
G(φ ∧¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2)Pr(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
 G(φ ∧¬ψ1)Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
+ G(φ ∧¬ψ1 ∧ψ2)Pr(ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0+ 0.
Here, we used the fact that Pr(a | b, c)Pr(b | c) = Pr(a, b | c). Since ψ1 ⇒ ψ2, we have
that ¬ψ2 ⇒¬ψ1. Thus, ¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ≡¬ψ2, and we get that
G(φ ∧¬ψ2)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0
as desired.
CUTw . Assume that D |=w φ→ ψ1, D |=w φ→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2) and D |=w (φ ∧ψ1)→ ψ2.
If G(φ) = 0, then D |=w φ → ψ2. Now, assume that G(φ) > 0. Applying
Lemma 3.10(b), we get that G(φ ∧ψ1) > 0 as well.
Since D |=w φ→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2), we have that
G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Since D |=w (φ ∧ψ1)→ψ2, we have that
G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)
G(ψ1 ∧ φ) ∼ 0.
Moreover, using Lemma 3.10 we get that D |=w φ → ψ1 implies that G(ψ1 ∧ φ)·
Pr(ψ1 | φ)/G(φ)∼ 1.
Applying Lemma 3.12(b), and multiplying by Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)/G(φ), we get:
8 We assume this value is not 0. Otherwise, the result is immediate.
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G(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
 G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 | ¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
+ G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(ψ1 | ¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
= G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
+ G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ)
G(ψ1 ∧ φ) ·
G(ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
= G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
+ G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)
G(ψ1 ∧ φ) ·
Pr(ψ1 | φ) ·G(ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0+ 0 ∗ 1= 0.
And thus D |=w φ→ ψ2.
CMw . Assume that D |=w φ→ ψ1, D |=w φ→ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2), D |=w φ→ ψ2, and D |=w
φ→ false.
If G(φ ∧ ψ1)= 0, then D |=w (φ ∧ ψ1)→ ψ2. Now, assume that G(φ ∧ ψ1) > 0, and
recall that D |=w φ→ false implies G(φ) > 0.
Since D |=w φ→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2), we have that
G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Using Lemma 3.10 we get that D |=w φ → φ1 implies that G(ψ1 ∧ φ) · Pr(ψ1 | φ)/
G(φ)∼ 1.
Applying Lemma 3.12(a) we obtain:
G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(ψ1 | φ ∧¬ψ2)
G(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)+G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 | φ ∧¬ψ2).
Applying Bayes rule to the left-hand side of this inequality, we get:
G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)Pr(ψ1 | φ)
Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)
G(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)+G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 | φ ∧¬ψ2).
Therefore:
G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)Pr(ψ1 | φ)
G(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)+G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ).
Dividing by G(φ) we obtain:
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G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)Pr(ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
 G(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
+ G(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 | φ)
G(φ)
.
Given our hypothesis, the last two terms on the right-hand side are infinitesimals. We can
conclude:
G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)
G(φ ∧ψ1)
∼ G(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)Pr(¬ψ2 | φ ∧ψ1)Pr(ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Where we have used the fact that G(ψ1 ∧ φ) · Pr(ψ1 | φ)/G(φ) ∼ 1. Thus D |=w (φ ∧
ψ2)→ ψ1. ✷
Before we prove Theorem 3.17 we need a lemma that shows the properties of ∆(·). This
lemma is analogous to Lemma 3.10.
Lemma A.1.
(a) ∆(A) Pr(B |A)∆(A∩B).
(b) ∆(A) Pr(B |A)∆(A∩B)+ Pr(B |A)∆(A∩B).
Proof. Part (a) follows immediately from the definition of ∆(A).
To prove part (b), recall that ∆(A) = maxC⊆A Pr(C | A)G(C). Let C be one of the
contexts that maximize this term. Thus
∆(A) = Pr(C |A)G(C ∩A)
 Pr(C ∩B |A)G(C ∩A∩B)+ Pr(C ∩B |A)G(C ∩A∩B)
 Pr(B |A)∆(A∩B)+ Pr(B |A)∆(A∩B).
The first inequality is derived from Lemma 3.12(b) and the second from Part (a) of the
lemma. ✷
Theorem 3.17. If D is a decision context, then Cns(D) satisfies system C′.
Proof.
REF. By definition, Pr(¬φ | φ)= 0, we get that
∆(φ ∧¬φ)Pr(¬φ | φ)
G(φ)
= 0.
LLE. By definition, if φ ≡ φ′, then ∆(φ) = ∆(φ′), ∆(φ ∧ ¬ψ) = ∆(φ′ ∧ ¬ψ), and
Pr(¬ψ ∧ φ)= Pr(¬ψ ∧ φ′). Thus, if D |=s φ→ ψ , then D |=s φ′ →ψ .
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RW. Assume that ψ1 ⇒ ψ2 and D |=s φ→ ψ1. If G(φ) = 0, then D |=s φ→ ψ2. Now
assume that G(φ) > 0. Then, since D |=s φ→ ψ1 we have that
Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Using Lemma A.1(a), we have that ∆(¬ψ1 ∧ φ) Pr(¬ψ2 | ¬ψ1, φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 ∧ φ).
Thus,
Pr(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Since ψ1 ⇒ψ2, we have that ¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 ∧ φ ≡¬ψ2 ∧ φ, and thus
Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
We conclude that D |=s φ→ ψ2.
CUT. Assume that D |=s φ→ψ1 and D |=s (φ ∧ψ1)→ψ2.
If G(φ) = 0, then D |=s φ→ ψ2. Now assume that G(φ) > 0. Using Lemma A.1(b),
we get
Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
 Pr(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
+ Pr(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
.
We now show both summands on the right-hand side to be infinitesimals. This would imply
the desired conclusion.
Consider the first summand: Using RW we conclude from D |=s φ → ψ1 that D |=s
φ→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2). Thus,
Pr(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Next, consider the second summand: Since D |=s (φ ∧ψ1)→ψ2, we have
Pr(¬ψ2 |ψ1 ∧ φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ ∧ψ1) ∼ 0.
Using Lemma 3.10 and D |=s φ→ ψ1, we get
Pr(¬ψ2 |ψ1 ∧ φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 ∧ φ)Pr(ψ1 | φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
But this is equal to the second summand, which is therefore an infinitesimal, as desired.
CM′. Assume that D |=s φ→ ψ1, D |=s φ→ψ2, and D |=w φ→ false. If G(φ ∧ψ1)=
0, then D |=s (φ ∧ψ1)→ψ2. Now, assume that G(φ ∧ψ1) > 0, and recall that φ → false
implies that G(φ) > 0.
We start with the following inequality.
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Pr(¬ψ2 |ψ1 ∧ φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ ∧ψ1)
= Pr(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
· G(φ)
Pr(ψ1 | φ)G(ψ1 ∧ φ) .
We will show that the first term in the right-hand side is an infinitesimal whereas the second
term is equivalent to 1. Together this will imply that the left-hand side is an infinitesimal,
and therefore, by definition, D |=s (φ ∧ψ1)→ ψ2.
First, considering the first term on the right-hand side: Since D |=s φ → ψ2, we have
that
Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Using Lemma A.1(a), we have that
Pr(ψ1 | ¬ψ2 ∧ φ)∆(ψ1 ∧¬ψ2 ∧ φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ φ).
Thus,
Pr(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
Next, considering the second term, and using the fact that D |=w φ → ψ1 and
Lemma 3.10, we have that
Pr(ψ1 | φ)G(ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 1.
This concludes the proof. ✷
Proposition 3.18. AND is valid in system C′.
Proof. If G(φ)= 0, we are done. Otherwise, we proceed as follows: In a manner identical
to the proof of Lemma A.1(b) we can show that for disjoint sets A and B:
∆(A∪B) Pr(A |A∪B)∆(A)+ Pr(B |A∪B)∆(B).
Letψ3 =ψ2∨¬ψ1. Hence,¬ψ3 =¬ψ2∧ψ1. This implies that¬ψ1 and¬ψ3 are disjoint.
To prove our claim it is sufficient to show that:
Pr(¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3 | φ)∆((¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
We know from φ→ ψ1 and φ→ψ2 that
Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0 and Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ φ)
G(φ)
∼ 0.
We will show that the numerator of the first fraction is smaller than the sum of numerators
of the latter two fractions.
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Pr(¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3 | φ)∆((¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3 ∧ φ)
 Pr(¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3 | φ)(Pr(¬ψ1 | (¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3)∧ φ)∆(¬ψ1 ∧ φ)
+ Pr(¬ψ3 | (¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ3)∧ φ)∆(¬ψ3 ∧ φ))
 Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ1 ∧ φ)+ Pr(¬ψ3 | φ)∆(¬ψ3 ∧ φ)
 Pr(¬ψ1 | φ)∆(¬ψ1 ∧ φ)+ Pr(¬ψ2 | φ)∆(¬ψ2 ∧ φ). ✷
Theorem 4.2. The following rules of inference are valid for → and❀:
(1) If φ ≡ φ′, then from φ❀ a infer φ′❀ a.
(2) From φ⇒ψ and φ❀ a infer φ ∧ψ❀ a.
(3) From φ ∧ψ❀ a and φ ∧¬ψ❀ a infer φ❀ a.
(4) From φ→ ψ and φ ∧ψ❀ a infer φ❀ a.
(5) From φ→ false infer φ❀ a.
Proof.
(1) Immediate from definition.
(2) Immediate from definition.
(3) Suppose that D |= (φ ∧ ψ) ❀ a and D |= (φ ∧ ¬ψ) ❀ a. If G(φ) = 0, then
D |= φ❀ a.
Assume that G(φ) > 0. Since D |= (φ ∧ψ)❀ a, we have that
MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ)
G(φ ∧ψ) ∼ 0.
Let δψ = (MEU(φ ∧ ψ) − EU(a | φ ∧ ψ)) · Pr(ψ | φ) and let ∆ψ = (EU(a |
φ∧ψ)−mEU(φ∧ψ)) ·Pr(ψ | φ). It is clear that δψ +∆ψ =G(φ∧ψ)Pr(φ∧ψ).
Thus δψ
δψ+∆ψ ∼ 0.
Similarly, let
δ¬ψ =
(
MEU(φ ∧¬ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ)) · Pr(¬ψ | φ),
∆¬ψ =
(
EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ)−mEU(φ ∧¬ψ)) · Pr(¬ψ | φ),
δ =MEU(φ)− EU(a | φ),
∆= EU(a | φ)−mEU(φ).
Since D |= (φ ∧¬ψ)❀ a, we have that δ¬ψ
δ¬ψ+∆¬ψ ∼ 0.
We want to show that δ
δ+∆ ∼ 0. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
δψ  δ¬ψ .
Since MEU(φ) Pr(ψ | φ)MEU(φ∧ψ)+Pr(¬ψ | φ)MEU(φ∧¬ψ), we have that
δ  δψ + δ¬ψ  2δψ.
On the other hand, if am is an action such that EU(am | φ)=mEU(φ), then
∆ = EU(a | φ)− EU(am | φ)
= Pr(ψ | φ) [EU(a | φ ∧ψ)− EU(am | φ ∧ψ)
]
+ Pr(¬ψ | φ) [EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ)− EU(am | φ ∧¬ψ)
]
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= Pr(ψ | φ) [EU(a | φ ∧ψ)− EU(am | φ ∧ψ)
]
− Pr(¬ψ | φ) [EU(am | φ ∧¬ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ)
]
 ∆ψ − δ¬ψ
 ∆ψ − δψ,
where the last inequality is by our assumption that δψ  δ¬ψ .
Combining these two inequalities, we have
δ
∆+ δ  2
δψ
∆ψ − δψ .
From δψ
∆ψ+δψ ∼ 0, we easily conclude that
δψ
∆ψ−δψ ∼ 0, and thus δ∆+δ ∼ 0.
(4) Assume that D |=w φ→ ψ , and D |= (φ∧ψ)❀ a. Also assume that G(φ) > 0 (for
otherwise D |= φ❀ a).
Since D |=w φ → ψ , we have that G(φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ))/G(φ) ∼ 0. Using
Lemma 3.10, we also have that G(φ ∧ψ)/G(φ) ∼ r > 0. Moreover, since D |=
(φ ∧ψ)❀ a, we have that
(MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ))
G(φ ∧ψ) ∼ 0.
Combining these facts get
MEU(φ)− EU(a | φ)
G(φ)
 (MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ))
G(φ)
+ (MEU(φ ∧¬ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ))
G(φ)
 (MEU(φ ∧ψ)− EU(a | φ ∧ψ) · Pr(ψ | φ))
G(φ ∧ψ) ·
G(φ ∧ψ)
G(φ)
+ G(φ ∧¬ψ) · Pr(¬ψ | φ))
G(φ)
∼ 0 · G(φ ∧ψ)
G(φ)
+ 0= 0.
Thus, D |= φ❀ a.
(5) φ → false implies that G(φ)/G(φ) is infinitesimal. This can only be the case if
G(φ) is 0, which immediately implies that D |= φ❀ a. ✷
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